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The establishment and maintenance of any existing “world order” 
is primarily based on a general aversion to international war and 
does not depend on the United States. This perspective disputes 
two explanations that rely heavily on American activities. One 
contends that the United States, aided perhaps by the attention-
arresting fear of nuclear weapons, was necessary to provide 
worldwide security and thus to order the world. The other 
contends that the United States was instrumental, indeed vital, in 
constructing international institutions, conventions, and norms, in 
advancing economic development, and in expanding democracy, 
and that these processes have crucially helped to establish and 
maintain a degree of international peace. This article traces the 
rise of an aversion to international war and argues that this, not 
US efforts, should be seen as the primary causative or facilitating 
independent variable in the decline of international war. 
This perspective also suggests that world order can survive, or 
work around, challenges that might be thrown at it by the United 
States or anyone else, that fears that a rising China or an assertive 
Russia will upset the order are overdrawn, that there is scarcely 
any need for the maintenance of a large military force in being, 
and that, under the right conditions, international anarchy, could 
well be a desirable state. 
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The countries in Europe have managed to remain free from substantial interstate 
war for 75 years—the longest period of time since Europe itself was invented as 
a concept some 2,500 years ago (Mueller 2021a). As Oxford University historian 
Evan Luard has noted, “Given the scale and frequency of war during the 
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preceding centuries in Europe,” this is “a change of spectacular proportions: 
perhaps the single most striking discontinuity that the history of warfare has 
anywhere provided” (Luard 1986). 
 Not only have developed countries, including the Cold War 
superpowers, managed to stay out of war with each other since 1945, but there 
have been remarkably few international wars of any sort during that period, 
particularly in recent decades. Indeed, over the last 30 years, there have been 
only three international wars as conventionally defined (at least 1000 battle or 
battle-related deaths). One was waged by Ethiopia and Eritrea in the last years 
of the 20th century. And the others, the only ones of the present century, are the 
brief regime-toppling invasions by the United States of Afghanistan and Iraq 
impelled by 9/11, wars that then devolved into extended counterinsurgency 
conflicts. 
 Although states may have largely abstained from conducting wars 
directly between themselves, the development has not necessarily led to the 
demise of warlike behavior in total. Indeed, states may well feel freer to engage 
in activities that might once have been taken to be a potential casus belli. Thus 
they still contest at other, less lethal, levels. These include tinkering in civil wars, 
seizing tiny bits of territory, firing shots across bows, lobbing cyber balloons, 
exacting economic sanctions, engaging in coercive economic diplomacy, 
attempting covert regime change, and poaching fish (Altman 2020; Braumoeller 
2019). And civil wars continue, though perhaps declining somewhat in number 
since the 1980s (Mueller 2021a). 
 This article examines possible explanations for the decline of 
international war. Although the argument can only be sketched in the space 
available, it disputes those that attribute the decline to US security activities or 
to a US-led “world order.” Rather, the rise of an aversion to international war is 
the most likely primary reason. Changes in ideas can often have substantial 
results, and it will be argued that much of the positive development of the post-
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World War II era would likely have happened even without much American 
security participation. Moreover, the establishment of norms and institutions, 
economic advance, and the progress of democratization are not so much the 
cause of international peace and an aversion to international war as their 
consequence. 
 This perspective also suggests that world order can survive, or work 
around, challenges that might be thrown at it by the United States or anyone 
else; that fears that a rising China or an assertive Russia will upset the order are 
overdrawn; that there is scarcely any need for the maintenance of a large 
military force in being; and that, under the right conditions, international 
anarchy could well prove to be an entirely tolerable condition. 
 
“Pax Americana” and the Rise of Aversion to International War 
A number of explanations have been advanced by analysts to explain the 
remarkable decline of international war (Fettweis 2010; Pinker 2011, 2018; 
Goldstein 2011; Horgan 2012; Gat 2017). This article focuses on two, often but 
not always related, that claim the decline can be heavily attributed to the 
activities of the United States. 
 The first is that the United States has provided worldwide security and 
thus order, perhaps aided by the attention-arresting fear of nuclear weapons. 
This is often labelled “Pax Americana,” and it relates to hegemonic stability 
theory in many of its forms. The second is that the United States was vital to 
construct international institutions, conventions, and norms; to advance 
economic development; and to expand democracy—and that these processes 
have ordered the world and crucially helped to establish and maintain 
international peace. 
 Along these lines, neoconservative writers Lawrence Kaplan and 
William Kristol (2003) argue that “in many instances, all that stands between 
civility and genocide, order and mayhem, is American power.” And former US 
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national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (2012) contended that “if 
America falters,” the likely outcome would be “outright chaos” and “a 
dangerous slide into global turmoil.” The United States, as Princeton’s John 
Ikenberry (2017), writes, is the “guarantor of the world order.” 
 These two explanations essentially rest on a counterfactual that is rarely 
carefully assessed by its advocates: if the United States had withdrawn from the 
world after 1945, things would have turned out much differently and, most 
likely, far worse. 
 Thus, political scientists Bruce Russett and John Oneal are among those 
who conclude that it was a US-supported European security community that 
made armed conflict between France and Germany “unthinkable” after World 
War II (2001; Thayer 2013). But it is entirely to look at the condition differently. 
The French and the Germans were once extremely good at getting into wars 
with each other, but since 1945 there seems to have been no one in either 
country who has advocated resuming the venerable tradition. 
 This reflects the fact that over the course of the twentieth century, a 
significant shift in attitudes toward international war took place—a change that 
scarcely needed the United States to provide either a militarized security 
environment built around nuclear fears or a set of norms, institutions, economic 
exchanges, and democracy. This can perhaps be quantified in a rough sort of 
content analysis. Before World War I, it was common, even routine, for serious 
writers, analysts, and politicians in Europe and North America to exalt war 
between states as beautiful, honorable, holy, sublime, heroic, ennobling, natural, 
virtuous, glorious, cleansing, manly, necessary, and progressive. At the same 
time, they declared peace to be debasing, trivial, rotten, and characterized by 
crass materialism, artistic decline, repellant effeminacy, rampant selfishness, 
base immorality, petrifying stagnation, sordid frivolity, degrading cowardice, 
corrupting boredom, bovine content, and utter emptiness (Mueller 1989; 
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Stromberg 1982; Brodie 1973). After the war, in stark contrast, such claims and 
vivid contentions are almost never heard.  
 It is not completely clear why World War I was such a turning point. 
There had been plenty of massively destructive wars before, many of them 
fought to the point of complete annihilation. And there were plenty that were 
futile, stupid, and disgusting—mud, leaches, and dysentery were not invented in 
1914. One notable change, however, was that World War I was the first war in 
history to have been preceded by substantial, organized antiwar agitation 
(Beales 1931; Mueller 1989). Although it was still very much a minority 
movement and largely drowned out by those who exalted war, its gadfly 
arguments were persistent and unavoidable, and this may well have helped 
Europeans and North Americans to look at the institution of war in a new way 
after the massive conflict of 1914-18. At any rate, within half a decade, war 
opponents, once a derided minority, became a decided majority. 
 There were, however, two countries which, in different ways, did not get 
the message. One was Japan—a less developed but increasingly powerful state 
that had barely participated in World War I. Many people there could still 
enthuse over war in a manner than had largely vanished in Europe (Vagts 1959). 
It took a cataclysmic war for the Japanese to learn the lessons almost all 
Europeans had garnered from World War I.  
 The second country was Germany. In contrast to Japan, however, it 
appears that only one person there was willing to embrace international war, but 
he proved to be crucial—he was a necessary, though not, of course, a sufficient 
cause for the war (Mueller 2004, 2018, 2021a). As military historian John 
Keegan (1989) stresses, “only one European really wanted war: Adolf Hitler:” 
And historian Gerhard Weinberg (1980) concludes that Hitler was “the one man 
able, willing, and even eager to lead Germany and drag the world into war.” 
 World War I made large majorities in Europe and North America into 
unapologetic peace-mongers, at least with regard to international war. Whether 
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one sees Hitler as a necessary cause or not, World War II reinforced that lesson 
in those places (probably quite unnecessarily), and it converted the previously 
militaristic Japanese in Asia.  
 
The Consequences of the Change 
Given this growth of aversion to international war, it seems unlikely that the 
United States, with or without nuclear weapons, was necessary for the 
international security that emerged after World War II, particularly in the 
developed world, nor was it required to institute new norms or institutions. 
 To begin with, as the United States was scarcely required to prevent war 
between Germany and France, the Cold War would likely have come out much 
the same no matter what policy the United States pursued. In particular, major 
conflict would likely have been avoided. As historian Vojtech Mastny (2006) 
concludes, all Soviet “scenarios presumed a war started by NATO” and “the 
strategy of nuclear deterrence [was] irrelevant to deterring a major war that the 
enemy did not wish to launch in the first place.” 
 It could be argued, of course, that this was a consequence of American 
deterrence policy. However, those holding that deterrence policy was essential 
need to demonstrate that the Soviets were ever willing to risk anything remotely 
resembling the catastrophe they had just suffered, whether nuclear or not. In 
addition, Moscow was under the spell of a theory that said they would 
eventually come to rule the world in a historically inevitable process to which 
they would contribute merely by safely inspiring and encouraging like-minded 
revolutionaries abroad. 
 Accordingly, it seems unlikely that the United States (or the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization) was required to avoid war with the Soviet Union. 
In the end, although the United States did ardently seek to oppose the ideology 
and its appeals, Communism ultimately self-destructed. Its domestic problems 
derived from decades of mismanagement and mindless brutality and from 
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fundamental misconceptions about basic economic and social realities. And its 
foreign policy failures stemmed from a fundamentally flawed, and often highly 
romanticized, conception of the imperatives of history and of the degree to 
which foreign peoples would find appeal in the Communist worldview. As 
analyst Stobe Talbott (1990) puts it, the Soviet system went “into meltdown 
because of inadequacies and defects at its core, not because of anything the 
outside world had done or threatened to do.” This suggests that the costly arms 
race was more nearly an indicator of international Cold War tensions than the 
cause of them. 
 Thus, insofar as good things have happened since the end of World War 
II, American security policy has been more nearly helpful than necessary, and 
its specific achievements in the twenty-first century have been more in 
dispensing war and disorder in places like Afghanistan and Iraq than in 
establishing peace and order. 
 The United States was certainly helpful after World War II in 
constructing international rules and institutions, promoting economic trade and 
development, and expanding democracy. But, as with security arrangements, it 
was scarcely necessary. The impelling, or facilitating, cause in the process again 
was the aversion toward international war. As scholar Richard Betts (1992) puts 
it for institutions of collective security: “peace is the premise of the system, not 
the product.” 
 If international peace is the general expectation, it becomes much easier 
to create institutions and to construct rules and conventions intended to be 
supportive and reinforcing. But it is primarily the deep desire for peace that 
causes the conventions and rules, not the other way around. It is similar to the 
way that the rule about driving on one side of the street has been the result, not 
the cause, of a rather widespread desire to avoid being killed by oncoming 
traffic. 
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 Thus, many of the institutions that have been fabricated in Europe are 
among the consequences of the remarkable international peace that has enveloped 
Western Europe since 1945, not its cause. If Europeans hardly needed the United 
States to decide that war among them was a really terrible idea, they did not need 
it to instill in them the notion that economic development and the quest for its 
ensuing prosperity was a good one. For example, it was the deep desire for 
international peace, not American machinations or simple economic 
considerations that was the impelling force for the creation of the coal and steel 
community between France and Germany, an arrangement that eventually 
evolved into the European Union. It is accordingly difficult to see why the 
institutions should get the credit for the peace that has flourished for the last three-
quarters of a century in Europe, but they do (Russett and Oneal 2001; Ikenberry 
2001, 2011). 
 There has also been a great expansion of international trade, 
interdependence, and communication, but this is more likely to be the 
consequence of peace than the cause of it. Moreover, any leadership in the 
process from the United States was substantially due to the huge size of its 
economy—all it had to do was allow access. 
 Peace may also furnish countries with the security and space in which to 
explore and develop democracy because democracy and democratic idea 
entrepreneurs are more likely to flourish when the trials, distortions, and 




Over the twentieth century, particularly within the ever-enlarging developed 
world, something that might be called a culture of peace or an aversion to 
international war has been established for how countries relate to each other. 
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The United States may not have been crucial for this development, but a 
number of strategic and policy implications stem from it. 
 First, because the United States has not been crucial for establishing and 
maintaining world order, that order can survive, or work around to accommodate 
or undercut, various challenges that might be thrown at it by the United States—
as during the administration of Donald Trump in recent years.  However deflating 
this conclusion might be to American triumphalists, it is good news more 
generally: maintaining world order is based on a general aversion to international 
war and does not depend on the United States. 
 Second, the remarkable rise in aversion to international war suggests that 
a major war among developed countries, one like World War II, is extremely 
unlikely to recur. Contrary to many current fears, it is unlikely that this 
agreeable condition will be punctured either by the rise of China as a challenger 
country or by excessive assertiveness by Russia backed by its large nuclear 
arsenal. 
 China has become almost the quintessential trading state. Its integration 
into the world economy and its increasing dependence for economic 
development and for the consequent acquiescence of the Chinese people are 
crucial. Armed conflict would be extremely—even overwhelmingly—costly to 
the country and, in particular, to the regime in charge. The best bet, surely, is 
that this condition will essentially hold. Indeed, there is a danger of making a 
China threat into a self-fulfilling prophecy, by refusing to consider both the 
unlikelihood and the consequences of worst-case scenario fantasizing, and by 
engaging in endless metaphysical talk about “balancing” (Betts 2012; Kirshner 
2020; Mueller 2021b). In addition, analysts point to a large number of domestic 
problems that are likely to arrest the attention of Chinese leaders in future years 
(Freeman 2018). 
 Concerns about Russian assertiveness have escalated since 2014 when 
there was an extortionary annexation of Crimea, a large peninsular chunk of 
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Ukraine, to Russia, and then a sporadic, and ultimately stalemated, civil war in 
Ukraine’s east. Although the crisis created, as Harvard psychology professor 
Steven Pinker notes (2015), “just the kinds of tensions that in the past had led to 
great-power wars,” nothing like that took place. Moreover, the Ukraine episode 
of 2014 seems to be a one-off—a unique, opportunistic, and probably under-
considered escapade that proved to be unexpectedly costly to the perpetrators. 
Massive extrapolation is unjustified and ill-advised (Person 2015; Bandow 
2016). 
 Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping, like Hitler in the 1930s, 
are appreciated domestically for their success in maintaining a stable political 
and economic environment. However, unlike Hitler, both are running trading 
states and need a stable and essentially congenial international condition to 
flourish (Rosecrance 1986). Most importantly, neither seems to harbor Hitler-
like dreams of extensive expansion by military means. It is true that both are 
leading their countries in an illiberal direction, something that might hamper 
economic growth, while maintaining a kleptocratic system. But this may be 
acceptable to populations enjoying historically high living standards and fearful 
of less stable alternatives. The two leaders (and their publics) do seem to want to 
overcome what they view as past humiliations. That scarcely seems to present a 
threat. The United States, after all, continually declares itself to be “the one 
indispensable nation”—suggesting that all others are, well, dispensable. If the 
United States is allowed to wallow in such self-important, childish, essentially 
meaningless, and decidedly fatuous proclamations, why should other nations be 
denied the opportunity to emit similar inconsequential rattlings? 
 Third, the rise of an aversion to international war suggests that there is 
scarcely a need to maintain a large military force by the United States (or pretty 
much another state). In fact, the achievements of the US military since World 
War II have not been very impressive. Some continue to maintain that it was 
the existence of the US military that kept the Soviet Union or China from 
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launching World War III. However, as suggested earlier, the Communist side 
never saw direct war against the West as being a remotely sensible tactic for 
advancing its revolutionary agenda. That is, there was nothing to deter. 
Moreover, for all the very considerable expense, the American military has won 
no wars during that period—especially if victory is defined as achieving a 
military objective at an acceptable cost—except against enemy forces that 
scarcely existed: Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, and Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991.  
 Maintaining huge and expensive US military force-in-being might make 
sense, despite the abundant record of failure, if there existed coherent threats 
that required such a force. Although there are certainly problem areas and issues 
in the world, none of these seems to present a security threat to the United 
States large or urgent enough. It may make sense to hedge a bit, however, by 
judiciously maintaining small contingents of troops for rapid response and for 
policing functions, a capacity to provide air support for friendly ground troops in 
localized combat, a small number of nuclear weapons for the (wildly) unlikely 
event of the rise of another Hitler, something of an effort to deal with cyber, an 
adept intelligence capacity, and the development of a capacity to rebuild quickly 
should a sizable threat eventually materialize 
 And there is a related issue: having a large force tempts leaders to use the 
military to solve problems for which it is inappropriate, inadequate, and often 
counterproductive. In the wake of the disastrous Vietnam War, Bernard Brodie 
(1978) wistfully reflected that “One way of keeping people out of trouble is to 
deny them the means for getting into it.” More than forty years later, Brodie’s 
admonition continues to be relevant. 
 
Conclusion: Anarchy May Well Be Tolerable or Even Desirable 
It has often been argued that, as Albert Einstein (1960) insisted, a world 
government is both an “absolute” and an “immediate” necessity for the demise 
of international war, something, he suggested, that might emerge naturally out 
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of the United Nations. As it happens, peace between major countries has been 
maintained and international war more generally has declined remarkably. 
However, the United Nations deserves little credit for this remarkable 
development, and world government none at all. 
 In fact, if the nearly 200 states that constitute the world order come to 
substantially abandon the idea that international war is a sensible method for 
solving problems among themselves, the notion that they live in a condition of 
“anarchy” becomes misleading. Technically, of course, the concept is accurate: 
there exists no international government that effectively polices the behavior of 
the nations of the world. The problem with the word lies in its inescapable 
connotations: it implies chaos, lawlessness, disorder, confusion, and both 
random and focused violence (Ellickson 1991; Bull 1977). 
 If that idea is abandoned—that is, if states understand that international 
war is not the way we do things anymore—“anarchy” could become a tolerable, 
or even a desirable, condition. It would be equally accurate to characterize the 
international situation as “unregulated,” a word with connotations that are far 
different and perhaps far more helpful. What would emerge is what Germany’s 
Hanns Maull (1990/91) calls a “system of cooperation and conflict among 
highly interdependent partners.” 
 The constituent states may still harbor a great number of problems and 
disputes to work out. But to work to resolve such problems while avoiding 
international war, those states would scarcely require an effective world 
government—or the efforts of a “hegemonic” United States. 
  And in the meantime, sustaining a bloated military force and 
anachronistically pursuing self-fulfilling “great-power” rivalries comes at great 
cost. And it risks undermining efforts to address problems like pandemics and 
climate change that require international cooperation and scarcely have a 
military component. 
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